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The Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism and Neoliberalism 
Sam Adelman 
1. Introduction  
This chapter provides an existential critique of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
also known as the Global Goals. With this aim in mind, I interrogate the meaning of 
sustainability, development and their concatenation in the idea of sustainable development 
from the Brundtland Commission’s promotion of the concept in Our Common Future in 1987 
to its current incarnation as a neoliberal form of green capitalism.1 My critique is developed 
in two parts. First, through an analysis of the differences between sustainable development 
and ecological sustainability. Sustainable development is widely embraced as a process that 
promotes sustainability despite the history of extractive, ecologically unsustainable economic 
development that prioritises economic growth over environmental protection.2 Endless 
economic growth is not sustainable if it breaches absolute biophysical limits and planetary 
boundaries, and ignores the rupture of the Earth system in the Anthropocene,3 the first 
geological epoch in which the activities of a single species, Homo sapiens, have irreversibly 
altered the geological structure of the planet. Human disturbance of the Earth system during 
the Great Acceleration following World War II is clear and connects the geohistory to human 
history with fateful consequences for all species.4 The Anthropocene is a rupture of the Earth 
system that poses fundamental epistemological and ontological challenges to humankind.5 
This rupture affects all forms of development, including the mainstream understanding of 
sustainable development provided by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987. I argue that ecological sustainability is incompatible with contemporary 
patterns of production and consumption and models of development that prioritise economic 
 
1 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press 1987). 
2 ‘Extractivism is a nonreciprocal, dominance-based relationship with the earth, one purely of taking. It is the 
opposite of stewardship, which involves taking but also taking care that regeneration and future life 
continue.’ Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 149. 
3 Johan Rockström et al., ‘Planetary boundaries: Exploring the safe operating space for humanity’ (2009) 
Ecology and Society 14(2); Will Steffen et al., ‘Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a 
changing planet’, (2015) Science: 347(6223). 
4 Earth system thinking systematically and systemically conceives the planet as a single unified, integrated and 
constantly changing entity rather than a collection of ecosystems. See Jan Zalasiewicz, Paul Crutzen and Will 
Steffen, ‘The Anthropocene’ in Felix M. Gladstein, James G. Ogg, Mark Schmitz and Gabi Ogg (eds), The 
Geologic Time Scale (Elsevier, 2012) and Jan Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Will Steffen and Paul Crutzen, ‘The 
New World of the Anthropocene’ (2010) Environmental Science and Technology 44(7), 2228-2231. On history 
in the Anthropocene, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry 
197–222. 
5 Paul J. Crutzen, ‘Geology of mankind’, (2002) Nature 415.6867, 23-23 at 23. 
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growth. The SDGs reproduce growth fetishism by promoting an intrinsically anthropocentric 
approach to sustainability that reinforces the longstanding criticism that sustainable 
development is an oxymoron. Herman Daly, a former World Bank economist and proponent 
of steady state economics, argues that ‘The term sustainable growth should be rejected as a 
bad oxymoron’.6 
In the first section, I discuss the troubled history of sustainable development. This is 
followed in section 2 by a discussion of the intrinsic anthropocentrism in international 
environmental and climate law reflected in the SDGs. The third section provides an 
immanent critique of the SDGs that leads to the conclusion that just as sustainable 
development fosters the illusion that it is possible to achieve endless economic growth and 
social justice while protecting the environment, so the SDGs promote the delusion that 
capitalism is the solution rather than the cause of the rupture in the Earth system and the 
ecological degradation and destruction that accompanies it. 
2. The Path from Development to Sustainable Development 
After the Second World War, development was promoted as the means whereby what was 
then referred to as the Third World could achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and 
promote social justice. In principle, development is a process of social change designed to 
improve the wellbeing of people. In practice, it has regularly manifested itself as 
underdevelopment or maldevelopment so that its scope and rationale have been vigorously 
contested. As Björn Hettne observes, it is ‘one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western 
ideas’ and is closely associated with growth and progress from backwardness to modernity,7 
and an almost teleological process of modernisation.8 As Westernisation, it was designed to 
incorporate developing countries into global capitalism; in the Soviet model, it was the path 
to socialism. Ecological sustainability was not a priority in either paradigm. In the 1970s and 
1980s, dependency and world systems theorists cogently argued that the development of the 
West depended upon long histories of colonialism and imperialism that incorporated what 
 
6 Herman E. Daly, ‘Toward some operational principles of sustainable development’ Ecological economics 2(1) 
(1990) 1. See also Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Sustainable development: on the political anatomy of an oxymoron’ in 
Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (Zed Books 1999); Michael 
Redclift, ‘Sustainable development (1987–2005): an oxymoron comes of age’ Sustainable development 13(4) 
(2005); Ulrich Brand, ‘Green Economy–the Next Oxymoron? No Lessons Learned from Failures of 
Implementing Sustainable Development’ (2012) GAIA 21(1). See also Death, n 29. 
7 Björn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds: Towards an International Political Economy of 
Development (Longman, 1995) 29. 
8 See Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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was then called the Third World into the global political-economy on unequal terms.9 Walter 
Rodney famously argued that Europe ‘underdeveloped’ Africa in pursuit of raw materials and 
profits, creating structural inequalities that persist to the present day.10 Such arguments 
reflected the significant anti-development or post-development backlash that emerged in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. For example, Arturo Escobar deployed Michel 
Foucault’s concept of power to argue that development is a power-knowledge nexus 
ostensibly designed to save the victims of underdevelopment from themselves while 
protecting the interests of the superpowers during the Cold War. Developmentalism became 
an almost evangelical ideology of salvation through industrialisation, modernisation and 
integration into the global political economy through the free trade and the exploitation of 
natural resources.11 It was a process that Wolfgang Sachs described as intrinsically and 
inexorably destructive of the environment and, we might add, that heightens risks to 
vulnerable communities.12 
Hettne writes that ‘Development is a contested concept, which implies that it has 
meant different things from one historical situation to another and from one actor to 
another.’13 One of the major criticisms levelled against the concept is that it has seldom been 
‘owned’ by those subjected to it and too often been imposed on populations through violent 
forms of neo-colonialism and imperialism that repeatedly resulted in chronic socio-political, 
economic and environmental crises. Gustavo Esteva argues that ‘The metaphor of 
development gave global hegemony to a purely Western genealogy of history, robbing 
peoples of different cultures of the opportunity to define the forms of their social life.’ It is a 
concept that cannot ‘delink itself from the words with which it was formed-growth, 
evolution, maturation’, and has become totemic-a magic solution to the problems that 
confront us. But for many people ‘this positive meaning of the word “development” . . . is a 
reminder of what they are not . . . To escape from it, they need to be enslaved to others’ 
 
9 Andre Gunder Frank, ‘The development of underdevelopment’, in Stephen M. Wheeler andTimothy Beatley 
(eds), The Sustainable Urban Development Reader (Routledge, 2004). 
10 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1972). 
11 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton 
University Press, 2011). See also Gustavo Esteva, ‘Development’ in Wolfgang Sachs (ed), The Development 
Dictionary; A Guide to Knowledge as Power (Zed Books, 1992). 
12 Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Environment’ in W. Sachs (ed), The Development Dictionary; A Guide to Knowledge as 
Power (Zed Books, 1992). 
13 Björn Hettne, Thinking About Development: Development Matters (Zed Books, 2009), 1. 
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experiences and dreams.’14 To the objects of development in the global South, it has always 
been a Eurocentric, technocratic, depoliticising concept. 
In response to persistent criticism, the dominant idea of development metamorphosed 
under the aegis of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) into human centred development (influenced by Amartya Sen’s 
conception of development as freedom) and latterly as sustainable development but economic 
growth has remained central.15 The emergence of neoliberalism in the early 1980s marked a 
crucial turning point. Hitherto, development had generally been understood as a state-driven 
process; afterwards, the so-called Washington consensus promoted dogmatic market 
fundamentalism that demanded privatisation, deregulation, free trade in pursuit of endless 
economic growth, the sanctity of private protection, and protection of contractual and 
investor rights.16 Eduardo Gudynas’s argument that the classical Western idea of 
development has been declared dead several times in the last decades but persists in a zombie 
form applies equally to the neoliberal ideology that infects sustainable development.17 
Neoclassical (especially neoliberal) economists view economic growth as essential 
and inevitable. Wellbeing is clearly linked to economic activity, but it is quality rather than 
the quantity that is crucial. As Kate Raworth observes, nothing in nature grows forever;18 
uncontrollable growth is cancerous. Since growth is hardwired into logic of capitalism, we 
are confronted with a conundrum: whether it is possible to achieve ecological sustainability 
in a mode of production that impels the breaching of planetary boundaries and if so, whether 
capitalism can be sufficiently reformed to permit this. ‘The development mentality is the 
daily manifestation of growth fetishism,’19 as Clive Hamilton argues, because the hegemonic 
conception of development cannot countenance non-capitalist economic activity or commons 
governance. 
 
14 Gustavo Esteva, ‘Development’ in Sachs, Wolfgang (ed), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power (Zed Books, 1992) at 9, 10. 
15 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2013). Sen attempted to shift the focus of 
development from growth to freedom and human capacities. 
16 See Baxi’s analysis of the emergence of trade-related, market-friendly human rights: Upendra Baxi, The 
Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
17 Eduardo Gudynas, ‘Buen Vivir: Today’s tomorrow’, (2011) Development 54(4) 441. 
18 Kate Raworth, Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist (Random House, 
2017). Raworth rehearses the overwhelming arguments against using GDP as the primary measure of 
development, not least because of the danger this poses to the Earth system. She advocates a form of economics 
that addresses impoverishment within planetary limits. 
19 Clive Hamilton, Growth Fetish (Allen & Unwin, 2003) 184. 
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Ramírez-Cendrero distinguishes between ‘pure’ post-developmental proposals such as 
buen vivir or those based on the rights of nature, identifies possible spaces for an alternative 
to capitalist development, and clarifies the differences between alternatives to development 
and alternatives to capitalism.20 He is sceptical that post-development models can transcend 
capitalism, although he recognises that ‘post-developmentalist criticism has contributed 
decisively to the awareness of the physical and environmental limits of capitalism’s 
production and consumption patterns . . . and the risks of neo-extractivism associated with 
new development strategies in some Latin American countries as merely new forms of 
capitalist modernization.’21 
In Latin America, alternatives to development have emerged based upon Andean 
cosmovisions such as buen vivir (roughly translated as living well). Many indigenous 
knowledges have no concept similar to the Western idea of development. Buen vivir takes 
several forms but all seek to dissolve the society-Nature dualism in Eurocentric rationality, to 
overturn the notion that human beings are the only source of values, and to move beyond 
modernity’s obsessions with growth and progress. It: 
moves away from the prevalence of instrumental and manipulative rationality. It rejects 
the modern stance that almost everything should be dominated and controlled, either 
persons or Nature, so as to become a means to our ends. Furthermore, the Buen Vivir 
does not endorse the classical understanding of a unidirectional linear progression of 
history, following a precise path, as several directions are possible.22 
Buen vivir is intrinsically pluralistic and rejects the hierarchies and dualisms that characterise 
Western philosophy but has nevertheless evolved to incorporate aspects of Western thinking 
where they are not antithetical, such as Western science. Its salience to sustainability flows 
from the conviction that wellbeing is only possible within a community in harmony with 
nature, symbolised by the centrality in its axiology of Pachamama (Mother Earth), the source 
of life. Buen vivir ‘calls for a “biocentric” understanding of life in which Nature has rights of 
its own and an intrinsic significance regardless of its value for human life’.23 As such, it 
 
20 There is a significant difference between alternative development and alternatives to development. Whereas 
the former envisages development in a different form, the latter rejects the concept of development as 
irredeemable. 
21 Juan M. Ramírez-Cendrero, ‘Limits and Contradictions of Post-developmentalism as a Heterodox Approach 
to Capitalist Development’, Capitalism Nature Socialism 2017 https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2017.1334220 
at 15. 
22 Gudynas n 17, 445. 
23 René Ramírez, ‘La transición ecuatoriana hacía el buen vivir’, in Irene León (ed.), Sumak Kawsay/Buen vivir 
y cambios civilizatorios (FEDAEPS, 2010) 24. 
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provides a coherent critique of modernity and hegemonic theories of development that rejects 
the reduction of human identity to a homo economicus defined by material consumption. It 
has a strong communitarian ethos that promotes substantive participatory democracy and 
progressive visions of social, environmental and climate justice.24 Buen vivir has been 
incorporated into the constitutions of Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009), albeit in 
contradictory ways.25 Above all, it promotes a conception of what sustainable development 
might mean that is markedly different to mainstream Western understandings. 
2.1. Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is a deceptively simple idea that is widely incorporated in domestic 
and international environmental law, but its meaning is contested. An obvious reading is that 
it is development that is sustained in the sense that it endures over a period of time, but it is 
more commonly understood as development ‘causing little or no damage to the environment 
and therefore able to continue for a long time.’26 The widespread purchase of this inaccurate 
perception illustrates the extent to which it has successfully been inculcated in public 
consciousness as an environmentally friendly process. 
Sustainable development emerged, albeit indirectly, at the 1972 UN Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm. The preamble is notably anthropocentric, linking the 
importance of protecting the environment to its impact on ‘the well-being of peoples and 
economic development throughout the world’.27 It became a leitmotif in Our Common Future 
in 1987 and the centrepiece of Agenda 21, a non-binding document adopted at the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, from which 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change emerged. In 2002, the 
 
24 Alberto Acosta, ‘El Buen (con) Vivir, una utopıa por (re)construir: Alcances de la Constitucion de 
Montecristi’, (2010) OBETS. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 6 (1), 35–67; Alberto Acosta and Eduardo Gudynas, 
‘La renovacion de la crıtica al desarrollo y el buen vivircomo alternativa’, (2011) Utopıa y Praxis 
Latinoamericana, 16 (53), 71–83 
<http://www.gudynas.com/publicaciones/GudynasAcostaCriticaDesarrolloBVivirUtopia11.pdf> accessed 15 
May 2017; Arturo Escobar, ‘Sustainability: Design for the Pluriverse’, (2011) Development, 54 (2), 137–140. 
25 The Ecuadorian Constitution guarantees the rights of buen vivir (articles 12-34) and grants rights to nature 
(articles 71-74). Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, 20 October 2008. In Bolivia, buen vivir 
informs the 2009 Constitution, which does not grant rights to nature. However, Pachamama is protected under 
the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Law 071 of the Plurinational State) passed by the Plurinational 
Legislative Assembly on 21 December 2010. 
26 Cambridge English Dictionary <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sustainable> accessed 5 
May 2017. 
27 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
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World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg produced non-binding 
declarations on sustainable consumption and production, water and sanitation, and energy. 
Principle 4 in the Rio Declaration makes it clear that ‘In order to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it’, but Principle 12 requires states to 
‘cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to 
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries.’ 20 years later, the ‘Common 
Vision’ of the Rio+20 summit in 2012 reaffirmed ‘the need to achieve sustainable 
development by: promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth.’28 
The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as ‘development that 
meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs,’29 and this has become the dominant framing in a formulation that 
proffered the possibility of integrating ‘economic development, social justice and 
environmental protection in a virtuous circle on the one hand, and a means of overcoming 
the physical limits of the biosphere through market solutions on the other’.30 Within five 
years of the publication of Our Common Future, more than 70 deﬁnitions of sustainable 
development had been proposed, demonstrating the chameleon-like capacity of the concept to 
mean all things to all people, but it is this vague capaciousness that enables states and 
transnational corporations to greenwash unsustainable activities by misleading the public 
about the environmental impacts of their products or services.31 Most of these definitions 
perpetuate instrumental rationality, progress, economic growth and they conceive nature as 
capital. Sustainable development has been described as ‘economic development that is 
complementary to environment and society, as a process of development that emphasises 
intergenerational equity or as a process of ensuring environmental services on a very 
 
28 Emphases supplied. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26, vol. I) and Agenda 
21 (A/CONF.151/26, vol. II), adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 14 
June 1992; United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Outcome Document: The Future We Want, 
20 to 22 June 2012. A/RES/66/288. 
29 WCED n 1, 43. 
30 Sam Adelman, ‘Rio+20: Sustainable Injustice in a Time of Crises’ (2013) Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 4(1), 6-31 at 11. 
31 Johan Holmberg and Richard Sandbrook, ‘Sustainable development: what is to be done?’ in Johan Holmberg 
(ed), Policies for a Small Planet (Earthscan, 1992). A notorious recent example are the measures taken by car 
manufacturers to defeat emissions tests for diesel cars: Jennifer K. Lynes, ‘Volkswagen committed the cardinal 
sin of greenwashing: Lying’, The Globe and Mail 24 September 2015 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/volkswagen-committed-the-cardinal-
sin-of-greenwashing-lying/article26500698/> accessed 27 June 2017. 
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long-term basis’;32 but as Ruth Gordon argues, it ‘appears to address what is essentially an 
enigma without meaningfully challenging existing power structures or the impact that the 
modern quest for a higher material standard of living has had on the natural world.’33 
The Commission treated development and sustainability as commensurate and 
interchangeable, and viewed poverty rather than unrestrained extractive industrialisation as 
the main enemy of sustainable ecosystems. It viewed poverty as a cause rather than a 
symptom of unsustainability and its solution was to encompass environmental issues within 
sustainable development rather than changing the dominant model of development. This is 
explicit from the outset: ‘What is needed now is a new era of economic growth–growth that 
is forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable.’34 The Brundtland 
report focused on the core concepts of needs and ‘limitations imposed by the state of 
technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future 
needs’ rather than biophysical limits and planetary boundaries.35 It considered the needs of 
current and future generations but not those of other species. In the view of Imran, Alam and 
Beaumont, its ‘anthropocentric approach fails to adequately acknowledge the relationship of 
environmental crises to environmental ethics and values . . . [and i]t does not adequately 
recognize the ecological limits of natural capital–i.e. the boundary beyond which exploitation 
of a natural resource will have signiﬁcant irreversible impacts.’36 This anthropocentrism is 
reflected in the report’s treatment of species and ecosystems as resources for development in 
assertions such as ‘Conservation of living natural resources is . . . crucial for development.’37 
The report accepts that conservation ‘is not only justified in economic terms’38 but the 
aesthetic, ethical, cultural, and scientific justifications it provides are also markedly 
anthropocentric. 
The Brundtland Commission sought to reconcile economic growth, social equity and 
environmental protection (the so-called the triple bottom line) in a single concept. Four 
decades later, in a world scarred by inequality, looming climate catastrophe and the rupture to 
 
32 Emmanuel Kumi, Albert A, Arhin and Thomas Yeboah, ‘Can post- 2015 sustainable development goals 
survive neoliberalism? A critical examination of the sustainable development- nexus in developing countries’, 
(2014) Environment Development and Sustainability 16, 539- 554 at 544. 
33 Ruth Gordon, ‘Unsustainable Development’ in Shawkat Alam, Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G Gonzalez and 
Jona Razzaque International Environmental Law and the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 63. 
34 WCED n 1, xii. 
35 WCED n 1, 43. 
36 Sophia Imran, Khorshed Alam and Narelle Beaumont, ‘Reinterpreting the Deﬁnition of Sustainable 
Development for a More Ecocentric Reorientation’, (2014) Sustainable Development 22, 134–144 at 135. 
37 WCED n 1, 147. 
38 WCED n 1, 155. 
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the Earth system, sustainable development’s ‘success’ is still predominantly measured in 
terms of economic growth. The concept has been condemned for fostering the illusion that 
endless growth is possible on a finite planet but as Haydn Washington argues, ‘In a finite 
world, we need to accept once and for all that sustainability cannot be about further growth. 
This challenge remains critical, though still denied.’39 
Escobar argues that sustainable development emerged through the: 
problematization of global survival, a process which induces a re-working of the 
relationship between nature and society. This problematization appeared as a response 
to the destructive character of development, on the one hand, and the rise of 
environmental movements in both the North and the South, on the other . . . [t]he 
ecodevelopmentalist vision expressed in mainstream versions of sustainable 
development reproduces central aspects of economism and developmentalism.40 
He argues that it ‘focuses not so much on the negative consequences of economic 
growth on the environment, as on the effects of environmental degradation on growth and the 
potential for growth.’41 Redclift contends that sustainable development ‘was coined in the 
1980s to meet contradictions in policy and practice, and to “square the circle” of resource 
conservation and economic growth . . . [but in practice] has been advocated primarily as a 
means of subordinating nature to economic growth.’42 In a similar vein, Wolfgang Sachs 
writes that it ‘promises nothing less than to square the circle: to identify a type of 
development that promotes both ecological sustainability and international justice’ in a 
formula ‘designed to maximize consensus rather than clarity.’43 Sachs argues that the 
Brundtland report failed to address the crisis of justice arising from unsustainable 
development and moved quickly from the conservation of nature to the conservation of 
growth.44 Seeking to maximise acceptance of the concept, the World Commission on 
 
39 Washington, Haydn. Demystifying Sustainability: Towards Real Solutions (Earthscan, 2015), 36 (emphasis in 
original). 
40 Arturo Escobar, ‘Constructing Nature: Elements for a poststructural political ecology’ in Richard Peet and 
Michael Watts (eds), Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (Routledge, 1996), 
51-52. 
41 Ibid, 54. 
42 Redclift, Michael, and Graham Woodgate. ‘Sustainable development and nature: the social and the material’, 
(2013) Sustainable Development 21(2), 92-100 at 92. 
43 Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature: On the Political Anatomy of an 
Oxymoron’ in Frank Fisher and Maarten A. Hajer (eds) Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural 
Discourse (Oxford University Press, 1999), 25-26. 
44 Ibid, 29. 
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Environment and Development provided capitalism with a conceptual basis and an 
ethical/normative justification for the commodification and monetisation of nature. 
Withering criticism of this kind has not deterred proponents of ecomodern 
developmentalism such as Jeffrey Sachs, who declaims that we have entered the era of ‘the 
Age of Sustainable Development’, ‘a world in which economic progress is widespread; 
extreme poverty is eliminated; social trust is encouraged . . . and the environment is protected 
from human-induced degradation.’45 Sachs believes that salvation does not require trade-offs 
between getting rich and saving the planet, but instead lies in the virtuous synergies that 
technology can deliver. A more realistic perspective is provided by advocates of degrowth 
who disparage the faith that discourses of ecological modernisation place in the role of 
markets, pointing to the deficiencies of carbon markets and the likelihood that 
decarbonisation will be cancelled out by unceasing economic growth. They argue that it is 
possible to achieve sustainable degrowth through the ‘equitable downscaling of production 
and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the 
local and global level, in the short and long term.’46 Healy, Martinez-Alier and Kallis write 
that: 
The promises of ecological modernization (i.e. dematerialization of the economy, 
economic growth linked to lower environmental impacts, win–win sustainable 
economic development) cannot be fulfilled. On the contrary, these promises and the 
assumptions on which they are based have evolved into discourses that legitimize the 
opening up of new spheres of capital circulation and accumulation. The ascendancy of 
the rhetoric of the ‘green economy’ or even ‘green growth’, and the promotion of 
markets for carbon and ecosystem services, illustrate this well.47 
 
45 Jeffrey Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development (University of Columbia Press, 2015) 3. The term 
Anthropocene appears three times in 543 pages. 
46 François Schneider, Giorgos Kallis and Joan Martinez-Alier, ‘Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for 
social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue’, (2010) Journal of Cleaner 
Production 18(6), 511-518 at 512. See also Arturo Escobar, ‘Degrowth, postdevelopment, and transitions: a 
preliminary conversation’ (2015) Sustainability Science 10(3), 451-462; Joan Martínez-Alier, Unai Pascual, 
Franck-Dominique Vivien and Edwin Zaccai, ‘Sustainable de-growth: Mapping the context, criticisms and 
future prospects of an emergent paradigm’ (2010) Ecological economics 69(9), 1741-1747; Tim Jackson, 
Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet (Earthscan, 2009). 
47 Hali Healy, Joan Martinez-Alier and Giorgos Kallis, ‘From ecological modernization to socially sustainable 
economic degrowth: lessons from ecological economics’ in Raymond L. Bryant (ed), The International 
Handbook of Political Ecology (Edward Elgar, 2015), 586. Ecomodernists are prominent amongst those 
celebrating the possibility of a ‘good’ Anthropocene made possible by techo-fixes such as geoengineering, 
terraforming, etc. Clive Hamilton, ‘The Theodicy of the “Good Anthropocene”’, (2015) Environmental 
Humanities 7(1), 233-238. On green economy, see Adelman, n 31. 
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As a core discourse of ecological modernisation, sustainable development frames eco-
political issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss and ecological degradation ‘as 
matters of scientific knowledge, technological innovation, and managerial perfection-an 
effort that has always been central to the paradigm of sustainability and the policy approaches 
of ecological modernization’ as a means of depoliticising them.48 In Erik Swyngedouw’s 
words, ‘Vague concepts like climate change policy, biodiversity policy or “sustainability” 
replace proper names in politics’ so that ‘[p]ost-political climate governance does not solve 
problems; it moves them around.’49 Environmental problems are addressed through 
environmental legislation or technological fixes frequently accompanied by market-based 
instruments.50 Maarten Hajer, a leading ecological modernisation theorist acknowledges that 
sustainable development does not call for structural change and is ‘basically a modernist and 
technocratic approach to the environment that suggests that there is a techno-institutional fix 
for the present problems . . . [it] does not address the systemic features of capitalism that 
make the system inherently wasteful and unmanageable.’51 
A decade after the euphemistically styled Great Recession, neoliberalism lives on 
zombie-like, incapable of providing viable responses to either sustainability or development, 
but seemingly incapable of being consigned to the dustbin of history.52 David Harvey 
describes neoliberal economics as an ideological smokescreen designed to conceal a more 
fundamental class project of accumulation by dispossession through private appropriation of 
the commons.53 Ecological sustainability will not be delivered by neoliberalism and it cannot 
be achieved through the dystopian anthropocentrism that disfigured the Holocene but is 
perpetuated by the SDGs. 
3. Anthropocentrism 
 
48 Ingulfor Blühdorn, ‘Sustainability-Post-sustainability-Unsustainability’ in Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, 
John M. Meyer, and David Schlosberg (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 268. 
49 Erik Swyngedouw, ‘Depoliticized environments and the promises of the Anthropocene' in Bryant, Raymond 
L. The International Handbook of Political Ecology (Edward Elgar, 2015), 140. 
50 Ian Bailey, Andy Gouldson, and Peter Newell, ‘Ecological modernisation and the governance of carbon: a 
critical analysis’, (2011) Antipode 43, 682–703. 
51 Arthur P. J. Mol and David A. Sonnenfeld, ‘Ecological Modernisation Theory in Debate’ in Arthur P. J. Mol 
and David A. Sonnenfeld (eds). Ecological Modernisation Around the World, 22. Mol and Hajer quoted in Oluf 
Langhelle, ‘Why Ecological Modernisation and Sustainable Development Should Not Be Conflated’ in Gert 
Spaargaren, David A. Sonnenfeld and Arthur P. J. Mol, The Ecological Modernisation Reader, 402–5, 414. 
52 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (Polity, 2011). 
53 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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Law is deeply, intrinsically and persistently anthropocentric.54 As Klaus Bosselmann puts it, 
‘The law cements the view that only humans matter and the environment has just 
instrumental value-a view with grave ecological blindness.’55 Law has been instrumental in 
naturalising the idea of nature as property over which human beings have dominion. Private 
property is a foundational concept in Western domestic law and international law, a 
consistent trope in which land and nature are primarily conceived as objects of ownership. 
Burdon argues that property rights epitomise Eurocentric approaches to the environment that 
justify humanity’s right to exploit and expropriate nature.56 In short, law legitimises the idea 
that nature exists solely to serve the needs of human beings. Earth jurisprudence, Wild Law 
and Law for Nature are prominent amongst emergent legal philosophies that seek to correct 
the deep anthropocentrism of law.57 
Anthropocentrism is the ‘idea that human interests, human goods and/or human 
values are the focal point of any moral evaluation of environmental policy and the idea 
that these human interests, goods and values are the basis of any justification of an 
environmental ethic’.58 Human beings exploit nature because they have come to conceive it 
as existing for their own personal benefit through unsustainable epistemologies of mastery 
and ideologies such as neoliberalism that are legitimated by anthropocentric legal systems.59 
We may perforce think as Anthropos but human cognitive abilities do not lead ineluctably 
either to anthropocentrism or the correct identification of long term human needs and 
interests.60 Indeed, the plethora of onto-epistemologies and the differential power to 
materialise illustrates the danger of treating Anthropos as a homogeneous, undifferentiated 
 
54 On mechanical jurisprudence, see Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei, The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System 
in Tune with Nature and Community (Berrett-Koehler, 2015). 
55 Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance (Ashgate, 2008) 135. 
56 Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (Siber Ink, 2002); Peter D Burdon (ed), 
Exploring Wild Law: The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Wakefield Press, 2011); Peter D. Burdon, Earth 
Jurisprudence: Private Property and the Environment (Routledge, 2015). See also Anna Grear, ‘Human rights, 
property and the search for “worlds other”’ (2012) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 3(2), 173-
195.  
57 Vito de Lucia, ‘Towards an ecological philosophy of law: a comparative discussion’, (2013) Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 4(2), 167–190. 
58 Eric Katz, ‘A pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism’, (1999) Environmental Ethics 21, 377–390 at 
377-378. 
59 Sam Adelman, ‘Epistemologies of Mastery in Anna Grear and Louis J. Kotzé (eds) Research Handbook on 
Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar 2015). 
60 On the nature of Anthropos, see Anna Grear, ‘Deconstructing anthropos: a critical legal reflection on 
‘anthropocentric’law and anthropocene ‘humanity’’, (2015) Law and Critique 26(3), 225-249; Anna Grear, 
‘‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’: Re-encountering Environmental Law and its ‘Subject’ with 
Haraway and New Materialism’ in Louis J Kotzé (ed), Environmental Law and Governance for the 
Anthropocene (Hart, 2017). 
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entity.61 Moreover, it is not inevitable that anthropocentrism will result in speciesism on the 
one hand or misanthropy on the other.62 The freedom to reason enables Homo sapiens to 
choose to embrace onto-epistemologies that give precedence to Gaia.63 
Despite these caveats, anthropocentrism is generally regarded as problematic on 
several grounds. Deontological thinkers believe it is wrong when it is negatively motivated, 
for example harming other species. Immanuel Kant argued that right action is motivated by a 
sense of duty derived from the categorical imperative. Virtue ethics hold that actions may not 
be negatively motivated but may still be regarded as intrinsically wrong if they fail to give 
equal value to the needs and interests of other species and the biosphere. Arguments for 
sustainability are made on the basis of obligation and virtue but the literature on 
sustainability, climate change and the Anthropocene increasingly reflects consequentialist 
perspectives buttressed by Earth and climate science in which actions are considered right or 
wrong in light of their actual or probable effects.64 Utilitarianism may be viewed as an 
anthropocentric version of consequentialism in which the pleasure, happiness, preferences 
and interests of human beings are the only relevant factors in assessing the correctness of 
actions.65 In the Brundtland report, sustainable development is ‘explicitly rooted in a 
 
61 Jason Moore is amongst those who argue that the idea of the Anthropocene is problematic because it does not 
give sufficient weight to the reality that a particular mode of production has successfully reinforced 
anthropocentric epistemologies already at work in religious, economic and political philosophies: Jason W. 
Moore, ‘The Capitalocene, Part I: on the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis’, (2017) The Journal of 
Peasant Studies. 44(3), 594-630. I agree with this position but use Anthropocene for the reason advanced by 
Donna Haraway, that it is well entrenched and seems less controversial than Capitalocene for many important 
players: Donna J. Haraway, ‘Staying with the Trouble Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’ in Jason W. 
Moore (ed), Anthropocene or Capitalocene?: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (PM Press, 2016). 
62 See Onora O’Neill, ‘Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism’ Environmental Values 6 (1997), 
127-42. 
63 James Lovelock, The Revenge of Gaia (Allen Lane, 2006). The Gaia hypothesis was initially proposed by 
Lovelock in 1970s. Named after the Greek goddess of the Earth, it argues that the advent of life on the planet 
generated a homeostatic tendency to regulate the biosphere in ways favourable to the development and 
maintenance of life. It gained wide public traction but is scientifically controversial. See Michael Ruse, The 
Gaia Hypothesis: Science on a Pagan Planet (University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
64 There is a difference between actual and expected consequentialism, i.e. between effects or harms that have 
already occurred and those that can reasonably be expected to occur. Stephen Gardiner argues that virtue ethics 
rather than consequentialist or deontological approaches are most appropriate to climate change because ethics 
is ‘not only about our relationships with other morally important entities, it is also about who we are.’ Stephen 
M. Gardiner, ‘Are We the Scum of the Earth? Climate Change, Geoengineering and Humanity’s Challenge’ in 
Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Meyer (eds), Ethical Adaptation to Climate Change: Human Virtues of the 
Future (The MIT Press, 2012) at 242; emphasis in original. On geoengineering and consequentialism, see Sam 
Adelman, ‘Geoengineering: Rights, Risks and Ethics’ (2017) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 
8(1), 119-138. 
65 The work of Peter Singer demonstrates that this form of consequentialism is not necessarily confined to 
human beings but can be extended to sentient beings. See for example Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 
(Cambridge university press, 2011). Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill gave consideration to other species 
but remained resolutely anthropocentric: Peter G. Brown, ‘Are there any natural resources?’, (2004) Politics and 
the Life Sciences 23(1), 12-21. 
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utilitarian and social philosophy that reﬂects a form of enlightened self-interest, conserving 
land and resources for later human use.’66 As neoliberal economics has demonstrated, this is a 
short step away from cost-benefit analyses that put a price on nature but cannot value it in 
non-monetary terms. 
Consequentialist theories differ according to the ways in which they deem actions to 
be right or wrong, whether such actions are evaluated on individual or collective bases, and 
the knowledge that agents have about potential consequences. The negative ecological 
consequences of the Anthropocene orient much philosophical thinking but consequentialism 
does not offer simple answers to unsustainability. As we have seen, ecomodernists who 
comprehend the scale of the planetary emergency, nevertheless resist the contention that 
anthropocentrism is the source of climate and environmental harms. 
Ecocentrism seeks to overcome the inherent anthropocentrism of Western modernity 
arising from the Descartian separation of society and Nature and the Baconian treatment of 
the environment as a set of resources that exist to service humanity.67 It sees intrinsic and 
moral value in nature, on which all living beings depend for survival, and views the Earth and 
the universe as an interconnected and interdependent web of sub-systems.68 Because human 
history and the geohistory are now inextricably linked and human agency has epochal 
geological consequences, it follows that anthropocentrism that correctly identifies the 
interests of current and future generations must paradoxically be premised upon a radical 
ecocentrism because human wellbeing is contingent upon the health of the Earth system. In 
this perspective, ecocentrism becomes a form of anthropocentrism.69 
For Donna Haraway, counterposing anthropocentrism and ecocentrism reflects a 
failure to comprehend the scale of the harms and changes we confront. Thinking in terms of 
the Anthropocene is too anthropocentric because it privileges ‘human exceptionalism’ in 
ways that occlude the nature of the problem as well as possible solutions. Haraway rejects 
 
66 Sophia Imran, Khorshed Alam and Narelle Beaumont, ‘Reinterpreting the definition of sustainable 
development for a more ecocentric reorientation’, (2014) Sustainable Development 22(2), 134-144 at 136. 
67 See Adelman, n 50. 
68 ‘Ecocentrism goes beyond biocentrism (ethics that sees inherent value to all living things) by including 
environmental systems as wholes, and their abiotic aspects. It also goes beyond zoocentrism (seeing value in 
animals) on account of explicitly including flora and the ecological contexts for organisms’, Haydn Washington, 
et al., ‘Why ecocentrism is the key pathway to sustainability’, The Ecological Citizen 1 (2017) at page Y. 
Kopnina argues that ‘moral ecocentrism is necessary if the interests of nonhumans are to be protected outside of 
utilitarian interests’: Helen Kopnina, ‘The victims of unsustainability: a challenge to sustainable development 
goals’, (2016) International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 23(2), 113-121 at 4. 
69 On the relationship between ecocentrism and deep ecology, see Helen Kopnina, ‘The Lorax complex: Deep 
ecology, ecocentrism and exclusion’, (2012) Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 9(4), 235-254. 
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both Anthropocene and Capitalocene in favour of thinking about and beyond the human, the 
non-human and the inhuman on the Chthulucene, the new Earth that requires new thinking.70 
Haraway excoriates those who naively fetishise technoscience, climate change catastrophists 
who foreclose possibilities, and those who do not adequately respect other species, the 
optimists who threaten to unleash hubristic anthropocentric techno-fixes such as 
geoengineering in pursuit of illusions of mastery, and the pessimists who are unwilling to 
think sympoietically about systems that are complex, self-organising, collectively producing, 
and boundaryless.71 
A more conventional approach is taken by Clive Hamilton, who argues that it is now 
too late to think about anthropocentrism with the intellectual tools of the Holocene because 
the Anthropocene has fundamentally altered what it means to be human. Since Anthropos has 
misidentified its interests, a new, reconceptualised anthropocentrism is required because the 
only way to promote human interests is by protecting the Earth system through a more 
rigorous, self-conscious anthropocentrism.72 More rather than less anthropocentrism is 
required to grasp both the immensity of the power humankind has accrued and the enormity 
of the obligations this imposes. Critiquing post-humanist thinking, Hamilton distinguishes 
between anthropocentrism as scientific fact and as normative claim and argues that the 
rupture to the Earth system means that it is too late to abandon anthropocentrism even if it 
were possible to do so. ‘The original fault in the growth-driven techno-industrial system is its 
monstrous anthropocentrism rather than its anthropocentrism as such. The problem is not that 
human beings are anthropocentric, but that we are not anthropocentric enough.’73 
Hamilton contends that only by recognising the super-agency that humankind has 
acquired as a geological agent can Homo sapiens accept the consequences of its behaviour 
and a commensurate level of responsibility needed to protect the biosphere and its biota. This 
new anthropocentrism, which can only emanate from an acknowledgement of the 
embeddedness of Anthropos in nature-as-a-whole, offers hope that it is still possible that 
human beings may use their immense, planetary changing powers to enhance rather than 
 
70 A concept derived from the Greek khthon, ‘of the earth’ and kainos, ‘completely new.’ 
71 Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Duke University Press, 2016). 
See also Anna Grear, ‘“Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene”: Re-encountering Environmental Law and 
its “Subject” with Haraway and New Materialism’ in Louis Kotzé (ed) Environmental Law and Governance for 
the Anthropocene (Hart, 2017). 
72 Clive Hamilton, Defiant Earth: The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene (Polity Press 2017). I paraphrase 
Hamilton’s terminology, which tends to treat human beings in an undifferentiated manner that ascribes equal 
agency and historical responsibility for the Anthropocene. 
73 Hamilton n 73, 43; emphases in original. 
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destroy the Earth system. The singular prize of the Enlightenment, our freedom to reason, is 
also freedom to choose to turn away from the calamitous path of capitalism. Hamilton 
counterposes his anthropocentrism to hubristic Promethean ecomodernist thinking that he 
regards as misanthropic rather than anthropocentric when it advocates solutions such as 
geoengineering that threaten the interests of humankind.74 
In Hamilton’s new anthropocentrism, the SDGs fail because they are both 
insufficiently and too anthropocentric. On the one hand, they continue to propagate an 
anthropocentric conception of development that does not adequately address the nature and 
scale of the rupture of the Anthropocene. On the other, they are not anthropocentric enough 
because they fail to acknowledge and accept the responsibilities that come with human 
agency on a geological scale and the irrefragable logic that follows now that the interests of 
the Earth system and humanity coincide completely, if temporarily, with the collision of 
human history and geohistory. The following section analyses the SDGs as a Holocene 
anachronism. 
4. The Sustainable Development Goals 
With the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) due to expire in 2015, preparatory work 
on the SDGs began at the Rio+20 summit in 2012. The outcome document, The Future We 
Want, called for the creation of an open Working Group to prepare a geographically ‘fair, 
equitable and balanced’ proposal for the SDGs.75 In September 2015, the non-binding SDGs 
were unanimously adopted by 193 members states in the UN General Assembly. Whereas the 
MDGs applied only to developing countries, the SDGs are global and extend the focus of 
international development beyond poverty to sustainability. And whereas the MDGs 
contained eight goals and met with mixed success, the SDGs contain 17 goals, 169 targets 
and 304 indicators. One study found less than a third (29 per cent) of the 169 targets to be 
well deﬁned and consistent with the latest scientiﬁc evidence, that 54 per cent could be more 
specific, and 17 per cent to be weak.76 Economic growth is still envisaged as the primary 
means of reducing poverty. Since the size of national income is valued more than the quality 
of economic activity and its relationship to human and ecological wellbeing, the SDGs hold 
 
74 Some ecomodernists terrifyingly speak about a ‘good Anthropocene’ in which profit can be made by using 
unproven technologies. Clive Hamilton, ‘The Theodicy of the “Good Anthropocene”’, (2015) Environmental 
Humanities 7(1), 233-238. 
75 UN General Assembly, ‘The Future We Want’, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/288, 27 July 2012, 
p. 64. 
76 ICSU/ISSC, Review of the Sustainable Development Goals: The Science Perspective (International Council 
for Science, 2015) 6. 
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fast to neoliberalism and thus fail to reconcile the contradiction between growth and 
sustainability at the core of sustainable development. They promote an anthropocentric 
approach to poverty reduction in which environmental protection is necessary only to the 
extent that it is consistent with growth in an extremely weak form of sustainable 
development.77 Paragraph 48 in Transforming Our World: The 20230 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development states that the signatory states ‘are committed to developing broader measures 
of progress to complement gross domestic product’ but it is not clear how ecological 
sustainability is to be measured. 78 The phrase ‘harmony with nature’ appears three times in a 
document that is resolutely anthropocentric and envisages economic growth on a scale 
incompatible with such harmony.79 Samir Amin argued that the MDGs were a discourse 
‘intended to legitimize the policies and practices implemented by dominant capital and those 
who support it,’ a charge equally applicable to the SDGs.80 The 2030 Agenda contains lofty 
ambitions and stirring rhetoric but no enforcement mechanisms.81 The signatories: 
envisage a world in which every country enjoys sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth and decent work for all. A world in which consumption and 
production patterns and use of all natural resources—from air to land, from rivers, lakes 
and aquifers to oceans and seas—are sustainable . . . One in which humanity lives in 
harmony with nature and in which wildlife and other living species are protected.82 
On face value, the goals are praiseworthy. They include the restoration of water-related 
ecosystems, a halt to the loss of biodiversity, ending overfishing, deforestation and 
desertification, achieving sustainable cities, and combating climate change-all undoubtedly 
necessary for ecological sustainability. The problem lies in the implicit underlying messages 
in the Agenda about the aims and meaning of development, and the many contradictions 
between its parts and its broader aspirations. 
 
77 On weak and strong forms of sustainable development, see Hopwood, Bill, Mellor, Mary and O'Brien, Geoff, 
‘Sustainable development: mapping different approaches’, (2005) Sustainable Development 13, 38–52. 
78 UN General Assembly, ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, 21 
October 2015, A/RES/70/1 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6e3e44.html> accessed 8 February 2017. All 
the paragraphs referred to in this section are from this document. 
79 The aim of Goal 12.8 is to ‘ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for 
sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature’ by 2030. 
80 Samir Amin, ‘The Millennium Development Goals: A Critique from the South’, (2006) Monthly Review 
57(10) 6. 
81 Joachim H. Spangenberg, ‘Hot Air or Comprehensive Progress? A Critical Assessment of the SDGs’, (2016) 
Sustainable Development. Like the Paris Agreement, the SDGs reflect the voluntarist nature and increasingly à 
la carte nature of international law. 
82 Para. 9; emphasis supplied. 
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The solutions offered ultimately fall short of effective regulation. They include 
‘environmentally sound management and safe use of chemicals, the reduction and recycling 
of waste and the more efficient use of water and energy’ (para. 34),;halving ‘capita global 
food waste at the retail and consumer levels’ by 2030 (Goal 12. 3); and encouraging 
‘companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices’ 
(Goal 12.6). The overall aim of Goal 12 is to achieve ‘sustainable patterns of production and 
consumption,’ which is worthy but inconsistent with the cognitively dissonant ways in which 
the Agenda promotes more consumption and production elsewhere.83 The underlying logic 
seems to be that the failure of extractive, growth-driven development to deliver sustainability 
is because it has not been imposed with sufficient rigour. Thus, Goal 8 calls for increased 
annual GDP growth in least developed countries and higher levels of economic productivity 
everywhere. Remarkably, sustained unsustainability is combined in a single sentence in the 
call for ‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all.’84 The targets further complicate the aim of this goal. 
Goal 8.1 aims to ‘Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national 
circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum 
in the least developed countries’ but says nothing about the logical corollary that growth in 
developed countries will need to substantially decrease to have any chance of meeting the 
2oC target or the exhortation to keep the increase in average global temperature below 1.5oC 
in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement on climate change (the latter being more consistent with 
climate science and the needs of least development countries). 
Goal 8.4 calls upon states to endeavour to decouple economic growth from 
environmental degradation through improvements in ‘global resource efficiency in 
consumption and production,’ which is essential because as Fletcher and Rammelt argue, 
‘without decoupling, the goals themselves will be unlikely to be achievable.’85 However, there 
 
83 There is substantial evidence of the negative impacts of unfettered consumption on the environment. See for 
example, John Bellamy Foster; Brett Clark and Richard York, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the 
Earth (Monthly Review Press, 2010); Ian Angus, Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Crisis of 
the Earth System (Monthly Review Press, 2016). Paul Ekins argues that a sustainable consumer society is 
another oxymoron: ‘The sustainable consumer society: a contradiction in terms?’, (1991) International 
Environmental Affairs 3, 243–257. It has been calculated that 4.1 Earths would be required if everyone on the 
planet consumed as much as an average US citizen: Charlotte McDonald ‘How many Earths do we need?’, BBC 
News, 16 June 2015 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33133712> accessed 14 February 2017. 
84 Emphases supplied. 
85 Robert Fletcher and Crelis Rammelt, ‘Decoupling: A Key Fantasy of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Agenda’, (2016) Globalizations, 2. Tim Jackson regards decoupling as a myth that is not economically feasible. 
Thomas Wanner describes it as a central myth of the Green Economy agenda. Tim Jackson, Prosperity without 
Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet (Routledge, 2011). Thomas Wanner, ‘The new ‘passive revolution’ of 
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is much scepticism about the likelihood of decoupling. Ward et al. use historical data and 
modelled projections to demonstrate how difficult it is to decouple GDP growth from 
increases in material and energy and argue that it is ‘is therefore misleading to develop 
growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible’.86 
Paragraph 68 states that ‘International trade is an engine for inclusive economic 
growth and poverty reduction, and contributes to the promotion of sustainable development.’ 
It is also an engine for skewed globalisation and massive inequality, and incompatible with 
sustainable production and consumption. Goal 17.10 calls for more trade liberalization and 
more power for the WTO. Goal 17.13 vaguely mentions the need to ‘enhance global 
macroeconomic stability’ through ‘policy coordination’ but provides neither specific targets 
nor the means for achieving this. The goal makes no mention of tax avoidance and evasion or 
debt service, which drain developing countries of vast amounts of income that could be spent 
on poverty reduction.87 The SDGs call for ‘debt financing, debt relief, and debt restructuring, 
as appropriate’ but not cancellation. Parts of the Agenda clearly read as if they were written 
by groups that had not been introduced to each other. 
The aim of Goal 10 is to reduce inequality within and between countries but the 
means of achieving this envisaged goal is likely to result in ecological catastrophe. Goal 10.1 
aims to ‘progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the 
population at a rate higher than the national average’ by 2030, but the SDGs do not address 
the causes of inequality or drivers of poverty such as free trade and the structural inequalities 
hardwired into the global economy.88 Goal 1.1 aims to ‘eradicate extreme poverty for all 
people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day’ by 2030 but 
 
the Green economy and growth discourse: Maintaining the ‘sustainable development’ of neoliberal capitalism’, 
(2015) New Political Economy 20(1), 21–41. 
86 James D. Ward, et al., ‘Is Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible?’, (2016) PloS one 
11(10) 10/14. 
87 Developing countries lose about $100 billion annually due to tax avoidance by transnational corporations: Tax 
Justice Network, ‘UNCTAD: multinational tax avoidance costs developing countries $100 billion+’, 26 March 
2015 <http://www.taxjustice.net/2015/03/26/unctad-multinational-tax-avoidance-costs-developing-countries-
100-billion/> accessed 25 May 2017. See also Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel ‘Tax evasion and tax 
avoidance in developing countries: The role of international profit shifting’, (Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation, 2010). The World Bank estimates that developing countries have paid more than $4.2tn in 
interest payments since 1980 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.INT.DECT.CD?locations=XO> accessed 
25 May 2017. 
88 Immanuel M.Wallerstein, ‘After Developmentalism and Globalization, What?’ (2005) Social Forces, 83(3), 
1263-1278; James Rice, ‘Ecological unequal exchange: Consumption, equity, and unsustainable structural 
relationships within the global economy’, (2007) International Journal of Comparative Sociology 48(1), 43-72. 
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as Jason Hickel points out, it is not possible to escape poverty on £1.25 per day.89 Although 
global GDP has increased by 271 per cent since 1990, the number of people living on less 
than $5 a day has increased by more than 370 million, demonstrating that the link between 
growth and poverty reduction is tenuous. The problem is not a lack of wealth but how it is 
distributed, and the SDGs offer no conception of distributive justice-nor, for that matter, 
environmental or climate justice-although the aim of Goal 5 is to achieve ‘gender equality 
and empower all women and girls.’ The poorest 60 per cent of the global population received 
just 5 per cent of all new income generated by global growth between 1999 and 2008.90 
Oxfam calculates that the richest one per cent has owned more wealth than everybody else on 
the planet since 2015, eight men own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the 
world, and the incomes of the poorest ten per cent of people grew by less than $3 a year 
between 1988 and 2011, while those of the richest one per cent increased 182 times as 
much.91 A recent study estimated that eradicating poverty will take at least 100 years at $1.25 
per day and 200 years at $5 per day, and global GDP will have to exceed $100,000 per 
capita.92 As Hickel argues, ‘To eradicate poverty global GDP would have to increase to 175 
times its present size if we go with $5/day. In other words, if we want to eradicate poverty 
with our current model of economic development, we need to extract, produce, and consume 
175 times more commodities than we presently do’.93 Maldevelopment of this kind that fails 
to address pathologies of accumulation and consumption will wreak ever greater ecological 
destruction and increase impoverishment as humanity hurtles down the path to madness. 
Ariel Salleh argues that ‘The SDG proposals are not just unrealistic but undemocratic, 
since the goals are to be realised by growing gross domestic product (GDP), increasing 
market liberalisation and free trade, as well as according more power to the World Trade 
 
89 Jason Hickel, ‘Five reasons to think twice about the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals’ 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/09/23/five-reasons-to-think-twice-about-the-uns-sustainable-
development-goals/> accessed 25 May 2017. 
90 The Story of Poverty <https://therules.org/campaign/the-story-of-poverty/> accessed 24 May 2017. 
91 Deborah Hardoon, ‘An Economy for the 99%: It’s time to build a human economy that benefits everyone, not 
just the privileged few’, (Oxfam International, 2017) <https://oxfam.app.box.com/v/an-economy-for-99-
percent/1/15862322999/122574711571/1> accessed 14 February 2017, 2. 
92 David Woodward, ‘Incrementum ad absurdum: global growth, inequality and poverty eradication in a carbon-
constrained world’, (2015) World Economic Review 4, 43-62. ‘The new global poverty line is set at $1.90 using 
2011 prices. Just over 900 million people globally lived under this line in 2012 (based on the latest available 
data), and we project that in 2015, just over 700 million are living in extreme poverty.’ The World Bank 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq> accessed 25 May 2017. 
93 Jason Hickel, ‘It will take 100 years for the world’s poorest people to earn $1.25 a day’, The Guardian 30 
March 2015 < https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/mar/30/it-will-
take-100-years-for-the-worlds-poorest-people-to-earn-125-a-day> accessed 24 May 2017. 
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Organization.’94 In a similar vein, Heloise Weber argues that neoliberal policies are explicit 
goals in a ‘framework that privileges commercial interests over commitments to provide 
universal entitlements to address fundamental life-sustaining needs. Political struggles over 
development will continue against the ideology of the SDG project and for transformative 
shifts for actually sustainable development.’95 
 
The SDGs bring to mind an Irish joke in which a lost tourist rolls down her car 
window and asks a local for directions to Dublin. He rubs his chin, thinks for a moment, and 
says ‘I wouldn’t start from here.’ In the Anthropocene, the point of departure for the goals 
should surely have been ecological sustainability rather than development. Starting with 
development as growth precludes ecological sustainability; starting with sustainability opens 
up a range of alternatives more likely to reduce poverty and promote social justice. Starting 
from ‘here’ with development subordinates the Earth system, most of the global population 
and all other species to the ‘needs’ of the economy. After all, it is possible to measure the 
health of the atmosphere, ecosystems oceans and species with increasing precision and to set 
targets in international environmental governance instruments such as the SDGs.96 Starting 
from ‘here’ reproduces the fallacies of modernity and Holocene thinking. Starting from ‘here’ 
reinforces neoliberal dogma and market fundamentalism by insisting that economic 
development requires free trade, protection of investor rights and the privatisation of 
commons when what is most needed is a new global ‘Grundnorm’, an organising principle 
for global governance enforced through a deceptively simple but utterly profound test for all 
economic activity: is it ecologically sustainable? 
5. Conclusion 
The SDGs are incommensurate with the scale and urgency of the unfolding planetary 
catastrophe and offer no real possibility of global, climate or social justice for current or 
future generations. They promote a weak, anthropocentric form of sustainable development 
that ignores ecological reality and continues to prioritise economic growth above social 
justice and environmental protection. They contain a ‘lack of consideration given to the need 
for radical change in people’s demands on the Earth’, and ‘a perpetuation of the view that 
 
94 Ariel Salleh, ‘Climate, Water, and Livelihood Skills: A Post-Development Reading of the SDGs’, (2016) 
Globalizations 13(6), 952–959 at 953. 
95 Heloise Weber, ‘“Politics of ‘Leaving No One Behind”: Contesting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 
Agenda’, (2017) Globalizations, 1-16 at 1 (emphasis in original). 
96 For example, the targets in articles 2 and 4 in the Paris Agreement. 
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nature is merely a collection of natural resources that can be subdued by the human race.’97 
Hickel maintains that the SDGs ‘lock in the global development agenda for the next 15 years 
around a failing economic model that requires urgent and deep structural changes.’98 
As Haydn Washington argues, development cannot be sustainable if it ignores 
ecological limits and planetary boundaries. Extractive, fossil fuelled growth is the driving 
force of unsustainability. Development cannot be sustainable and prioritise endless economic 
growth while leaving contemporary patterns of production, consumption and accumulation 
unchanged because the commodification and monetisation of nature are anathema to 
sustainability.99 To be ecologically sustainable, economic activity cannot replicate the 
anthropocentric shortcomings of Eurocentric rationality predicated upon dominium over 
nature; it cannot be an alternative form of development rebadged as sustainable development 
but an alternative to development. 
The MDGs enjoyed mixed success.100 When commentators review the SDGs in 2030 
hopefully they will not find that global poverty was reduced in a series of pyrrhic victories 
that came at the cost of widespread ecological destruction, species extinction and growing 
injustice from climatic harms because the goals were based on Holocene thinking. If not, they 
may lament the failure to move beyond the contradictions of a conception of development 
that could never have been sustainable and belatedly accept that ecological sustainability 
should have been the starting point, the focus and the central goal of Agenda 2030 rather than 
an optional extra because sustainability is a precondition for all attempts to reduce poverty in 
the Anthropocene. 
 
97 Colin C. Williams and Andrew C. Millington, ‘The Diverse and Contested Meanings of Sustainable 
Development’, (2004) The Geographical Journal 170(2), 101. 
98 Jason Hickel, ‘Why the new Sustainable Development Goals won’t make the world a fairer place’ 
<http://theconversation.com/why-the-new-sustainable-development-goals-wont-make-the-world-a-fairer-place-
46374> accessed 2 June 2017. 
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100 Despite a decline during the fifteen years of the MDGs, approximately 700 million people remain in extreme 
poverty: World Food Programme <https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/climate-impacts> accessed 1 November 
2016. These numbers would be substantially higher but for China’s dramatic growth since 1979. 
